

UN climate negotiations in Doha, Qatar

by Clare Demerse and P.J. Partington

At a Glance

After a dramatic finish last year in Durban, this year's UN climate negotiations in Doha, Qatar could deliver a productive outcome that gets countries on track for more action in the short term and agreement by 2015 for a new global deal, beginning in 2020. For Canada, the Doha talks will once again put the federal government's climate policy under a microscope. Unfortunately, our negotiators can expect a rough ride from the international community unless Canada commits to taking the far stronger actions needed to hit its 2020 target.

Context

Near the end of each year, negotiators from every corner of the globe convene to work towards an effective global approach to tackling climate change. Held under the auspices of the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), these negotiating sessions aim to take the principles countries agreed to in that treaty and make them tangible. This year's session, to be held in Doha, Qatar from November 26 to December 7, is the

18th political-level meeting of countries that are party to the treaty, and is thus often referred to as COP18, for "Conference of the Parties 18".

The best-known product of these talks thus far is the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, which contains quantified emission reduction targets for developed countries for the 2008 to 2012 period. For years now, countries have been grappling with what happens after Kyoto's first phase ends. The dramatic conclusion of last year's negotiations in Durban provided an answer: the Kyoto Protocol will enter a second phase,¹ starting on January 1, 2013 and ending in either 2017 or 2020. The European Union (EU), other European countries and Australia² have opted to participate in the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol; Canada, Russia and Japan will not.³ (The U.S. never ratified

¹ 1/CMP.7, Paragraph 1, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a01.pdf#page=2>.

² For details of Australia's conditions of participation, see: Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, Minister for Industry and Innovation, "Australia ready to join Kyoto second commitment period," press release, November 9, 2012, <http://www.climatechange.gov.au/~media/Files/minister/combet/2012/media/November/Combet-MediaRelease-302-12.pdf>.

³ For a summary of countries' targets and plans for the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, see: Annex 1

the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol. As this note describes below, Canada is also withdrawing from the first phase of the Kyoto Protocol.)

Kyoto is the only binding agreement that commits developed countries to cut their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions; it also established an architecture of emissions accounting rules and international trading that will now remain in effect. The Protocol's recognition that richer countries have a responsibility to lead in reducing emissions is very important to poorer countries as one means of building a fair global approach to tackling climate change. In Durban, the agreement to continue the Kyoto Protocol into a second phase was essential to securing developing countries' support for the other main outcome from the 2011 talks, a commitment to "develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties."⁴ Countries gave themselves until 2015 to negotiate this new agreement, which would take effect in 2020.

While most headlines focused on those outcomes at Durban's conclusion, the talks also took an important step forward in the area of climate financing. In the UN negotiations, "financing" refers to financial support that rich countries provide to poorer countries to help them adapt to the consequences of climate change and reduce their own emissions. Climate financing will be a crucial part of

of the Kyoto Protocol decision from the 2011 Durban negotiations,
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/durban_nov_2011/decisions/application/pdf/awgkp_outcome.pdf.

⁴ 1/CP.17, Paragraph 2,
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=2>.

any successful global deal to reduce emissions, because it recognizes that poorer countries bear little responsibility for the global warming we're now experiencing and yet face significant costs as a result. (Those costs include the added price of bypassing conventional technologies and going straight to lower-emission options; developing countries will also require tens of billions of dollars to build climate-resilient infrastructure and support communities coping with the impacts of a warmer planet.)

In Durban, countries approved the "governing instrument" of a new global fund for climate financing, the Green Climate Fund.⁵ However, they left some hard work on climate financing to this year's Doha talks, including wrapping up the arrangements for the Fund's accountability and — even more importantly — securing funding from donor countries via "an early and adequate" round of pledges.⁶

What's at Stake in Doha

More than 100 ministers will arrive at the Doha talks in time for the "High-Level Segment," which opens on December 4 and is scheduled to conclude on December 7⁷ — although wrapping up on time is not the UNFCCC's forte. At a technical level, a success in Doha would

⁵ 3/CP.17, Paragraphs 1 and 2,
<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/eng/09a01.pdf#page=55>.

⁶ Ibid, Paragraph 9.

⁷ UNFCCC, "UNFCCC Executive Secretary: Doha's COP18/CMP8 climate change conference must deliver objectives to speed up inadequate climate action," press release, November 21, 2012,
http://unfccc.int/files/press/news_room/press_release_s_and_advisories/application/pdf/pr_20121121_pre_cop18.pdf.

mean signing off on a package that includes:

- **An amendment that allows for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.** Countries will also need to agree on the length of time this phase should run, with some preferring an eight-year period (which would see the second phase of Kyoto continue until the new agreement takes effect in 2020), with others support a five-year period that allows for stronger targets to kick in before 2020.
- **A clear and ambitious workplan to negotiate the new international agreement.** The new negotiating track for the 2020 agreement is known as the “ADP,” a shorthand for the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action.” An effective workplan must lay the groundwork for a final result in 2015, and must find ways to address key questions like environmental ambition and equity.
- **Financial commitments from donor countries of significant new support for climate action in developing countries,** particularly under the Green Climate Fund.

But even that outcome would fall short if countries do not also take steps to tackle climate change more aggressively in the short term. The Durban outcome made this clear: in the decision that establishes a working group for the new agreement, countries noted that “the process shall raise the level of ambition,” and committed to do this by identifying “a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the

highest possible mitigation by all Parties.”⁸

Right now, it’s clear that countries’ pledges to reduce emissions don’t add up to their goals.

At the Cancun negotiations in 2010, countries committed to “reducing global greenhouse gas emissions so as to hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C above pre-industrial levels.”⁹ This is the temperature increase that leaders have agreed would constitute “dangerous” climate change, and they pledged in Cancun to take “urgent action” to avoid crossing the 2°C line. (For many countries in the negotiations, even a 2°C limit is too much — they consider an increase of no more than 1.5°C to be far safer, and the Cancun negotiations agreed to consider that limit as well.)

Given the widespread political support for these goals, several high-profile studies have assessed whether countries are on track to avoid 2°C of global warming. The UN Environment Programme’s “Emissions Gap” assessments are likely the best known. The 2012 edition, released in November, concludes that even if countries adopted their more ambitious pledges and adopted stringent rules in their emissions accounting, there would still be an eight billion tonne gap between countries’ efforts and the trajectory needed to stay on track for “just” 2°C of global warming. As the report points out, this means that

⁸ 1/CP.17, Paragraphs 6 and 7.

⁹ 1/CP.16, Paragraph 4, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>.

countries' efforts have closed just 40% of the gap between "business as usual" and a trajectory that would give a reasonable chance of avoiding a 2°C increase in global temperatures. The report makes it clear that it is still possible to close the gap, but "the challenge is the current pace of action," which needs to be significantly ramped up.¹⁰

Recent analysis from the International Energy Agency documents the same trend. The agency's flagship World Energy Outlook report for 2012 concludes that, even after accounting for "all new developments and policies," the world is on track for a long-term average global temperature increase of 3.6°C.¹¹

Those assessments make it clear that just keeping the negotiations on track this year isn't enough. Countries also have to take every opportunity to raise the bar, both in the near-term (before 2020) and in their approach to the new global treaty. Scientific assessments of what the atmosphere can bear must be at the heart of the talks, not an afterthought; countries must be willing to lead rather than waiting for others; and the negotiations must reflect the urgency that a year of record-breaking storms, floods and droughts should have brought home to all the delegates. Specifically, raising the

ambition at the talks would see the participating countries:

- **Increase their near-term pledges of targets and actions.** Some countries have committed to a range of potential targets; those countries should take the opportunity to move in Doha to the higher end of their target range.
- **Avoid emissions accounting methods that let countries take credit for more reductions than the atmosphere actually "sees"** (for example, lenient forestry accounting rules or "double counting" offset credits).
- **Adopt an approach to an upcoming review of the overall environmental goal that can inject new science and increased ambition into the negotiations on the new global agreement.** Countries agreed at the Cancun talks in 2010 that they had to assess the adequacy of the 2°C limit,¹² a review that would factor in the latest science and consider moving to a limit of 1.5°C instead. This review is scheduled to run from 2013 to 2015, so countries must find a way to feed its findings into the negotiations on the new global agreement in a timely way.

In addition, increasing the level of ambition requires developed countries to pledge substantial new funding to help poorer countries make an early transition to a clean energy future.

¹⁰ United Nations Environment Programme, Emissions Gap Report 2012 (Executive Summary), 3, 4, http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgap2012/portals/50143/Emissions2012_Exec%20Summary_EN.pdf.

¹¹ International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2012, 23 (full report available for purchase only); Executive Summary is available at <http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,33339,en.html>.

¹² 1/CP.16, Paragraphs 4, 138, 139, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2010/cop16/eng/07a01.pdf#page=2>.

FACT BOX: Why the Doha Negotiations matter to Canada

The UN climate negotiations can seem very remote from what's happening on the ground, and the process is painfully slow compared to what the science tells us about the urgency of climate change. So why should Canadians care what happens at the Doha talks?

The most important reason is that climate change is a global problem, so we need some kind of an international approach to tackle it. The greenhouse gases that cause climate change don't respect national borders: a tonne of GHG pollution emitted in Tokyo has just as much impact on Canada's climate as a tonne emitted in Saskatoon. While cities, provinces and individual citizens all have a role to play, we'll have a far better chance of preventing a climate catastrophe if countries can find ways to work together effectively.

A strong international agreement on tackling climate change would have important benefits for Canada, including:

- 1. Reducing the costs of climate change.** While it's the world's poorest and most vulnerable who are likely to feel the worst impacts (due to their greater vulnerability), climate change carries real economic risks even in a G8 country like Canada. Analysis from the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy found that climate change costs for Canada "could escalate from roughly \$5 billion per year in 2020 — less than 10 years away — to between \$21 billion and \$43 billion per year by the 2050s." Those estimates assume that the world is reasonably successful at limiting global warming: if warming exceeds the two degree threshold, the NRTEE found that catastrophic climate change could cost from five to 25% of gross domestic product (GDP).¹³
- 2. Canada is already seeing the impacts of climate change.** A summary of key Canadian climate change impacts produced by Environment Canada in February 2012 (obtained under Access to Information legislation) notes that:
 - 2010 was the warmest year on record in Canada, with temperatures 3°C above average. It was also the 14th consecutive year of above-normal temperatures in Canada.
 - There are an average of 20 more days with rain per year now than in the 1950s.
 - Water shortages, droughts, pest infestations and forest fires are imposing rising costs on Canada's regions.
 - Arctic sea ice is eroding, with summer ice levels in the Arctic reaching their second-lowest level on record in 2011.¹⁴
 - The linking of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans due to Arctic ice melt is "altering animal ranges and opening new pathways for disease."¹⁵

¹³ National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, *Paying the Price: The Economic Impacts of Climate Change for Canada* (September 2011), <http://nrtee-trnee.ca/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/paying-the-price.pdf>.

¹⁴ After Environment Canada's summary was prepared, this year saw a new record set for the loss of Arctic summer sea ice. See http://nsidc.org/news/press/20121002_MinimumPR.html for more information.

3. Tapping into the growing global clean energy economy. Taking stronger action to reduce our GHG pollution would position Canada better to benefit from the jobs and economic growth offered by the clean technology sector. A strong global climate deal would provide an incentive for Canada to do more to tackle its own emissions; an international agreement would also create a bigger export market for clean technologies. A 2012 assessment from the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy found that world-wide spending on low-carbon goods and services “could reach between \$3.9 and \$8.3 trillion by 2050, depending on climate policy assumptions.” In Canada, adopting stronger climate policies is projected to spur domestic low-carbon spending of about \$60 billion in 2050. The report also notes that low-carbon goods and services sectors “grow more rapidly than the Canadian economy overall” to 2050.¹⁶ Similarly, economic analysis has found that Canada’s governments could create more jobs by implementing strong climate policies than by continuing with business as usual.¹⁷

It’s also worth noting that Canada’s approach to the UN climate talks has implications for our foreign policy as a whole. In many countries, reaching agreement on an international approach to tackle climate change is a top foreign affairs priority. Negotiating tactics that are viewed as unhelpful or unconstructive can harm Canada’s reputation, and that damage can carry over into other areas of international relations. For example, media reports have linked Canada’s poor performance on climate change to our failure to win a seat on the UN Security Council.¹⁸

The converse is also true: climate-unfriendly policy positions outside of the UN climate talks will count against Canada at the negotiating table in Doha. For example, European negotiators in Doha will be well aware that Canada has lobbied aggressively against the proposed treatment of oilsands in the EU’s Fuel Quality Directive,¹⁹ a policy aimed at reducing GHG pollution from fuels.

¹⁵ For the full document, obtained by journalist Mike De Souza, see <http://www.scribd.com/doc/108725304/Key-Climate-Change-Impacts-2012-02-17>.

¹⁶ National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, *Framing the Future: Embracing the Low-Carbon Economy Executive Summary* (October 2012), 18, <http://nrtee-trnee.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/framing-the-future-summary-eng.pdf>.

¹⁷ For a summary of the literature, see *Reducing Pollution, Creating Jobs*, a 2011 Pembina Institute report available at <http://www.pembina.org/pub/2178>.

¹⁸ The Canadian Press, “Canada Won’t Try Again for Security Council Seat,” December 28, 2011, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2011/12/28/pol-baird-security-council.html>.

¹⁹ Climate Action Network Canada has tracked this lobbying effort through Access to Information Requests, many of which are available at <http://climateactionnetwork.ca/2011/10/12/the-tar-sands-long-shadow-2/>.

Canada's Track Record

In recent years, Canada has frequently found itself on the receiving end of criticism from other countries and observer groups at the UN climate talks. The critiques have focused on Canada's failure to reduce its emissions as promised under the Kyoto Protocol, and on negotiating positions that have been seen as asking others to do more without doing the required heavy lifting ourselves.

Even given that track record, Canada's performance at last year's Durban talks constituted a low point. While Canada was dogged by rumours that the government planned to drop out of the Kyoto Protocol throughout the conference, Environment Minister Peter Kent kept quiet until his return to Canada. Then, within hours of returning from the Durban talks, Minister Kent announced Canada's decision to formally withdraw from Kyoto, on the grounds that the treaty "doesn't work" because it "doesn't cover the major emitters, like the United States and China" and would impose undue costs on Canadians.²⁰

Of course, this announcement stood in stark contrast to the decision taken at Durban to extend the Kyoto agreement for at least another five years.

²⁰ Environment Canada, Statement by Minister Kent (December 12, 2011), <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800>. The first part of the government's omnibus budget bill, which was assented to in June 2012, also repealed the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act, Canada's domestic legislation in support of Kyoto accountability. See <http://parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Docid=5697420&file=4> (Division 53, part 4).

In response to Canada's withdrawal from Kyoto, the Executive Secretary of the UN climate convention, Christiana Figueres said, "I regret that Canada has announced it will withdraw and am surprised over its timing... Whether or not Canada is a Party to the Kyoto Protocol, it has a legal obligation under the Convention to reduce its emissions, and a moral obligation to itself and future generations to lead in the global effort." Figueres added that industrialized countries "whose emissions have risen significantly since 1990, as is the case for Canada, remain in a weaker position to call on developing countries to limit their emissions."²¹

The UN's climate chief put her finger on an important implication of Canada's rejection of Kyoto: it is difficult to have any credibility in asking others to do more when you back out of your own commitments.

On paper, Canada has a number of climate goals. As a signatory to the Cancun Agreements and the Copenhagen Accord, Canada has endorsed the global 2°C emissions limit. As a member of the G8, Canada also signed on to a 2009 declaration that added some specificity to the 2°C limit, noting that staying below 2°C means supporting "a goal of developed countries reducing emissions of greenhouse gases in aggregate by 80% or more by 2050."²² And in the month

²¹ UN News Centre, "Canada's withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol regrettable – UN climate official," December 13, 2012, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=40714&Cr=climate+change&Cr1#.UKvGS4Vb5pE>.

²² Leaders' Statement, L'Aquila G8 Summit (July 2009), Paragraph 65, <http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/summit/2009laquila/2009-declaration.pdf>. The statement notes that

following the Copenhagen negotiations, Canada formally adopted a 2020 target of reducing its emissions to 17% below the 2005 level, a goal that mirrors the U.S.'s 2020 target.²³

Unfortunately, the reality is that no one believes that Canada has the policies in place to hit its target. Three recent formal assessments, each using different methods, reached the same conclusion:

- An audit of Environment Canada's plans to meet its target published in 2012 by Canada's Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development, Scott Vaughn, concluded that "it is unlikely that enough time is left to develop and establish GHG regulations that together will contribute sufficient GHG reductions to meet the 2020 target."²⁴
- Using economic modeling tools, the National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy estimated in 2012 that "almost half the required reductions are likely to be achieved through existing

the baseline for this commitment is "compared to 1990 or more recent years."

²³ Government of Canada letter to UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer, http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_15/copenhagen_agreement/application/pdf/canadacphaccord_app1.pdf. Canada's letter retains the flexibility to adjust the target if the U.S. adjusts theirs, noting that Canada's final target is to be "aligned with the final economy-wide emissions target of the United States in enacted legislation."

²⁴ Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development — Spring 2012, Chapter 2: *Meeting Canada's 2020 Climate Change Commitments*, 34. http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl_cesd_201205_02_e.pdf.

and proposed government measures," with provincial measures responsible for the majority (about three-quarters) of expected reductions by 2020.²⁵ The NRTEE's press release for that analysis summarizes the findings by saying that "Canada will not achieve its 2020 GHG emission reductions target unless significant new, additional measures are taken. More will have to be done. No other conclusion is possible."²⁶

- Environment Canada's own 2012 assessment of progress towards the 2020 target finds that existing federal and provincial measures get us "one half of the way to meeting Canada's target."²⁷ This assessment includes a 25 million tonne (Mt) deduction for emissions sequestered in soils and forests thanks to a category called "Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry" (LULUCF), which new UN rules allowed Canada to include for the first time this year. However, the government notes that this credit is "preliminary in

²⁵ National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy (NRTEE), *Reality Check: The State of Climate Progress in Canada* (June 2012), 73, 89. <http://nrtee-trnee.ca/reality-check-the-state-of-climate-progress-in-canada>.

²⁶ NRTEE, "Canada not on track to achieve 2020 climate target," press release, June 13, 2012, <http://nrtee-trnee.ca/june-13-2012-new-release-canada-not-on-track-to-achieve-2020-climate-target>. The Government of Canada announced in its 2012 budget that the NRTEE will be eliminated as of March 31, 2013.

²⁷ Environment Canada, *Canada's Emissions Trends 2012* (August 2012), 4. http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/253AE6E6-5E73-4AFC-81B7-9CF440D5D2C5%5C793-Canada%27s-Emissions-Trends-2012_e_01.pdf

nature and will change as a result of ongoing efforts to improve data and methodologies.”²⁸ The report notes that “upcoming federal policies, in particular oil and gas regulations, will further contribute to the additional 113 Mt required for Canada to meet its commitments.”

Of course, making a “further contribution” is not the same thing as fully closing the gap. Indeed, some federal policies have moved in the wrong direction recently: the government significantly weakened its regulations for coal-fired electricity generation between the initial draft and the final edition, ending up with a regulation that will be only half as effective over its first decade as the government’s initial proposal.²⁹ Meanwhile, the government has not made any kind of announcement of regulations to curtail GHG pollution from the oil and gas sector, leaving Canada’s fastest-growing source of emissions — the oilsands sector — without any federal constraint on its GHG pollution.

Because Canada’s target is aligned with the U.S.’s 2020 goal, it’s interesting to consider the results of an economic analysis published in October 2012 by Resources for the Future, a Washington-based independent research organization focused on energy and environmental policy. Researchers Dallas Burtraw and Matt Woerman found that as long as the government continues with its current regulatory effort, the U.S. is essentially on

²⁸ Ibid., 3.

²⁹ The Pembina Institute, “Pembina reacts to federal climate change regulations for coal-fired power,” press release, September 5, 2012, <http://www.pembina.org/media-release/2372>

track to hit its 2020 target, reaching a reduction of 16.3% below the 2005 level (compared to a U.S. target of 17% below the 2005 level). The researchers attribute this projection to three factors: the Environmental Protection Agency’s GHG regulations under the Clean Air Act; trends in fuel prices and increasing energy efficiency; and state-level policy initiatives.³⁰ This analysis was completed before “Superstorm” Sandy moved climate change back up the policy priority list in Washington, raising the prospect of renewed focus on the problem from the White House under a re-elected President Obama.³¹

While the two countries’ economies are different, Canada does enjoy some of the same advantages — including provincial-level policy initiatives and a handful of federal GHG regulations. So why is the U.S. essentially on track to hit its 2020 target while Canada isn’t even in the ballpark?

More than anything else, the difference comes down to the oilsands. Assuming that current policies continue,³² emissions from the oilsands are expected to nearly triple by 2020, growing from 32 Mt in 2005 to 104 Mt in 2020.³³ The oilsands are the only sub-sector within

³⁰ Dallas Burtraw and Matt Woerman, *U.S. Status on Climate Change Mitigation*, Resources for the Future (October 2012), 1–2, <http://www.rff.org/Publications/Pages/PublicationDetails.aspx?PublicationID=22073>

³¹ James Gerken, “Obama Addresses Climate Change in First Press Conference Since Re-election,” *Huffington Post*, November 14, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/11/14/obama-climate-change_n_2131419.html.

³² Including Alberta’s Specified Gas Emitters Regulation.

³³ Canada’s Emissions Trends 2012, Table 5 (p. 24).

Canada's oil and gas portfolio that is projected to increase its emissions to

2020. The emissions growth from the oilsands alone — a total of 73 Mt — virtually cancels out all the reductions that Environment Canada projects other parts of the economy will make by 2020, which add up to 75 Mt.³⁴ See Figure 1, below.

The outsized role of Canada's oilsands sector in our climate policy likely won't go unnoticed in Qatar, a major oil exporter in its own right. And while Qatar is the country with the world's highest per capita GHG emissions, the province of Alberta's are 28% higher.³⁵

The International Energy Agency's (IEA) 2012 World Energy Outlook report shows




Figure 1: Greenhouse gas emissions trends for economic subsectors in Canada from 2005 to 2020 measured in megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (Mt CO₂e), adapted from Environment Canada's 2012 GHG forecast report. As illustrated, no other sector in Canada's economy is projected to increase its GHG pollution as rapidly as the oilsands.

³⁴ Canada's Emissions Trends 2012, 20 and 24. Total oilsands emissions growth (including upgrading) from 2005 to 2020 is projected to be 73 Mt; projected reductions by 2020 are projected to be 41 Mt from the electricity sector, 7 Mt from emissions-intensive and trade exposed sectors, 2 Mt from agriculture and 25 Mt from land use, land-use change and forestry, for a total of 75 Mt.

³⁵ Pembina Institute calculation using 2010 energy-related CO₂ data for Qatar (available from <http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/name,32870,en.html>) and Canada's National Inventory Report Part III for Alberta's emissions, with a per-capita calculation using Statistics Canada's 2010 population tables. Alberta's per-capita emissions were 47.3 tonnes/person in 2010 while Qatar's were 36.9 tonne/person.

in concrete terms what Canada's bet on oilsands extraction means for the climate. The IEA analysis includes a "450 scenario," a projection that offers a fair chance of staying within the 2°C limit. In that scenario, the IEA found that more than two-thirds of proven fossil fuel reserves cannot be commercialized before 2050 unless developers make a "significant deployment" of carbon capture and storage technology. In other words, barring a massive investment in a costly emission-reduction technology, avoiding dangerous climate change means that two-thirds of reserves have to stay in the ground.

Indeed, even the IEA's main scenario, which corresponds to over 3.5°C of global warming, projected oilsands production is lower (at 2.9 million barrels per day in 2020)³⁶ than the Government of Canada's 2020 projection of 3.2 million barrels/day.³⁷

An important implication of the IEA's assessment is that in a world where countries actually take steps to stay below 2°C of warming, there's far less demand for oil, with global demand forecast to peak this decade and begin declining thereafter. (As the IEA notes, "the profits of public and private companies in fossil-fuel rich countries could be cut and state income from taxes and royalties reduced.")³⁸ The IEA shows

that you can either have strong climate policy or no-holds-barred fossil fuel development, but you can't have both at once. So while Canada is nominally supportive of a 2°C limit, the federal government moved in the other direction by taking steps to speed up resource development, most recently through the 2012 federal budget.

Earlier this month, Environment Minister Peter Kent said that "I think it's quite clear that we are seeing increased incidents of extreme weather, droughts, floods, the diminishing ice cap, ozone opening and closing over the poles. You don't have to convince me that climate change is a very real and present danger and we need to address it."³⁹ That's a heartening statement from the minister who will head Canada's delegation in Doha, where he will have the opportunity to back up his comments with tangible actions.

In addition, the federal government's anemic domestic efforts are not the full picture for Canada: provincial governments control key levers for climate and energy policy as well, and many are taking significant actions. The list of notable policies includes B.C.'s carbon tax, Ontario's feed-in tariff policy to promote renewable energy, Nova Scotia's cap on coal power, and Quebec's implementation of a cap-and-trade system with California. While it needs to be far stronger, Alberta's Specified Gas Emitters Regulation represented early

³⁶ IEA World Energy Outlook 2012, 107.

³⁷ Canada's Emissions Trends 2012, 25. By way of comparison, the 450 scenario in the 2010 edition of the World Energy Outlook projected that oilsands production would reach just over 3 million barrels/day of production in 2035 (rather than 2020, as Environment Canada projects). See World Energy Outlook 2010, Part B, p. 450.

³⁸ IEA World Energy Outlook 2012, 259.

³⁹ Margo McDiarmid, "Climate Change a 'Real and Present Danger,' Kent Says," *CBC News*, November 19, 2012, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/11/19/pol-peter-kent-weather-climate.html>.

leadership in carbon pricing when it came into effect in 2007.

But in the hands of a federal government committed to the rapid development of Canada's oilsands resources, climate policy risks becoming collateral damage. One rhetorical example of this is the Conservative party's repeated attempts to discredit carbon pricing⁴⁰ — a position that would not sit well with the growing list of jurisdictions adopting carbon pricing policies, including South Korea, Australia, the EU, Norway, South Africa, California, China and more.

Doing Better in Doha

Durban's decision to continue the Kyoto Protocol calls on developed countries to cut their aggregate emissions to "at least 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020."⁴¹ Canada's 2020 target falls far outside that range; it's equivalent to 3% above our 1990 emission level of 589 Mt. But given the inertia we've seen from the federal government to date, even hitting our current 2020 target would be a significant step forward.

In Doha, Canada could surprise the world by coming forward with a serious and credible plan to hit its 2020 target. Doing so would help to erase some of the credibility problems that have plagued Canada's climate performance, and would allow our delegation of negotiators to play a far more constructive role in the talks as a whole.

⁴⁰ Conservative Party of Canada, "Conservative Party launches radio ad on Thomas Mulcair's Carbon Tax," news release, November 7, 2012, <http://www.conservative.ca/?p=2385>.

⁴¹ 1/CMP.7, preambular text.

Canada also committed to provide its fair share of climate financing over the 2010–2012 period. Developed countries committed in Copenhagen to raise a total of (US) \$30 billion in so-called "fast start" financing, and Canada committed to provide \$1.2 billion over the three years from 2010 to 2012, or roughly 4% of the total. While 4% would indeed represent a "fair share" contribution from Canada,⁴² the government's allocation of that funding to date has favoured loans over grants, which reduces the value to recipient countries. Canada has also made a far greater investment in activities to reduce emissions than in adaptation, an area where some of the world's poorest and most vulnerable urgently need assistance.⁴³

About \$200 million of that initial three-year pledge remains to be allocated,⁴⁴ and we would expect to see an announcement of funding details during the Doha talks. This final fast-start announcement provides Canada an opportunity to come closer to a balance between adaptation and emission reduction funding, and to provide a greater share of the total as grants. Canada could also stake out a leadership position by providing some of that financing as an initial contribution to the Green Climate Fund. Any announcement of "fast start" financing in

⁴² See the Pembina Institute's response to the 2010 financing announcement at <http://www.pembina.org/media-release/2039>, and a detailed assessment of Canada's fair share at <http://www.pembina.org/pub/1815>.

⁴³ For a more detailed assessment of Canada's 2010 financing allocation, see <http://www.pembina.org/blog/413>.

⁴⁴ See Table 1 of Canada's 2012 fast-start financing progress report at http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/fast_start_finance_progress_report_canada_-_final.pdf.

Doha would not be complete without committing to continuing to provide our fair share after 2012, which will mean ramping up Canada's annual contribution from 2013 onwards.

In recent years, the UN climate talks as a whole have provided some reason for optimism — although countries are still very, very far from where the science shows they need to be. But small as it is, any progress we've seen internationally has yet to translate into more ambition from Canada's federal government. Instead, we've seen an even greater emphasis on resource development, with no proportionate effort to reduce the emissions and other environmental impacts that development will create.

Right now, Canada's emissions are projected to keep growing unless our governments work much harder to curtail them. Other countries are well aware that targets mean little without plans to hit them. Unless Canada's government starts showing that it's serious about tackling greenhouse gas pollution, our climate negotiating team may be in for a rough ride in Doha.